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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper discusses the size of impact of carbon motivated border tax adjustments on 
world trade. We report numerical simulation results which suggest that impacts on welfare, 
trade, and emissions will likely be small. This is because proposed measures use carbon 
emissions in the importing country in producing goods similar to imports rather than carbon 
content in calculating the size of barriers. Moreover, because border adjustments involve both 
tariffs and export rebates, it is the differences in emissions intensity across sector rather than 
emissions level which matters. Where there is no difference in emissions intensities across 
sectors, Lerner symmetry holds for the border adjustment and no relative effects occur.  
In our numerical simulation analyses border tax adjustments accompany carbon 
emission reduction commitments made either unilaterally , or as part of a global treaty and to 
be applied against non signatories. We use a four-region (US, EU, China, ROW) general 
equilibrium structure which captures energy trade and has endogenously determined energy 
supply so that global emissions can change with policy changes. We calibrate our model to 
2006 data and analyze the potential impacts of both EU and US carbon pricing at various 
levels, either along with or without carbon motivated BTAs policies on welfare, emissions, 
trade flows and production. Results indicate only small impacts of these measures on global 
emissions, trade and welfare, but the signs of effects are as expected.  BTAs alleviate leakage 
effects as expected. In trade impacts, compared with no BTAs, BTAs reduce imports of 
committing countries, and increase imports by other countries. EU and US BTAs against 
China reduce exports by China. With BTAs, the value of production in the country with 
carbon reduction measures are introduced increases, and other country’s production decreases 
compared with the case of no BTAs. With the contraction of world trade flows caused by the 
financial crisis, carbon motivated BTAs offer a  prospect of a compounding effect in a world 
which is going protectionist and decarbonized  at the same time, but the added effects of 
BTAs seems small. 
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1. Introduction 
      Emerging policy proposals for carbon based tariffs or border tax adjustments by EU, US 
and other OECD countries against developing countries that do not participate in global 
emissions reduction agreements are a central issue for current climate change negotiations1. 
Although not formally part of the post Bali road map, de facto the threat of such measures is 
a central part of the negotiation process. Proposals for carbon motivated tax adjustments 
include both import tariffs (carbon tariffs) and export rebates by countries with emissions 
reduction commitments against those without commitments.  
    Such border adjustments by participating countries are driven by two related objectives. 
One is to provide competitiveness offsets for domestic producers since the added costs for 
domestic producers involved with domestic carbon pricing impose a competitive 
disadvantage on them. The other is leakage, i.e. that the reductions in emissions in 
participating countries such as the EU and the US generate increases in emissions elsewhere. 
For countries such as China, who are heavily export-oriented, and towards manufactures, the 
prospect is one of a world being decarbonized and going protectionist at the same time 
against a background of a continuing downturn in world trade for the financial crisis. 
      Border tax adjustments and both their rational and effects on trade is not a new topic. 
Earlier debate on border tax adjustments occurred following the adoption of the value added 
tax in the EU as a tax harmonization target in the early 1960’s (see Dosser (1967), Shibata 
(1967), Krauss & Johnson (1972)). The academic literature at that time suggested that with 
BTAs, a change between origin and destination is simply that between a broadly based 
production and consumption rate both of which are neutral, with no direct effects on trade. 
Neutrality of trade, production, and consumption effects would thus prevail under a tax basis 
change (see Krauss & Johnson (1972), Whalley (1979), Grossman (1980), and Lockwood et 
al.(1994)). As recently noted by Lockwood & Whalley (2008), carbon motivated border tax 
adjustments differ by product and sector, and so unlike in the debate on the VAT one needs to 
distinguish between price level and relative price effects (Neumark (1963), Hufbauer(1996)).  
With product or sector specific BTAs, relative price effects will come into play, and 
neutrality only holds in special cases. 
     This paper presents numerical simulation results exploring the effects of carbon motivated 
border tax adjustments in large OECD economies on welfare, global and country emissions, 
                                                 
1 See Brewer(2008), Dröge & Kemfert (2005),Weber & Peters(2009). 
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trade flows and production1. We use a multi-region general equilibrium structure covering the 
US, EU, China and a residual rest of the world. In this, countries produce commodities of 
varying emissions intensities using substitutable fossil fuel based oil and non-oil inputs. 
Unlike in conventional trade models in which there is a fixed endowment of factor inputs for 
each country, here we incorporate a supply function for energy exporting countries with 
increasing extraction costs. Since emissions are directly related to energy use in production, 
emissions levels globally are endogenously determined and can change with policy change. 
      In our numerical simulation analysis of BTA’s we construct a benchmark global 
equilibrium data set based on data for 2006 using a number of data sources. This covers 
production, consumption , and trade between the four regions (China,EU,US, ROW) .We 
calibrate our model to this data set using literature based estimates of key elasticities.   
       Results show that BTAs effects generally are small, depending on the carbon pricing (or 
size of emissions mitigations) adopted by importing countries. This is because both using 
carbon emissions in production of comparable goods in importing countries produces small 
barriers compared to using direct carbon content of goods and what produces real side effects 
is the difference in emission intensity across goods not the level of emission. Carbon border 
adjustments are not neutral since border tax adjustments in the carbon case are sector specific 
and relative price effects occur. Carbon BTAs alleviate the leakage effects as expected, but 
counteract the global emissions reduction effect of carbon pricing. Compared with no BTAs, 
BTAs reduce imports of committing countries, and increase imports by other countries. With 
BTAs the value of production in countries with carbon taxes increases, and other country’s 
production (in value terms) decreases compared with no BTAs.   
                                                 
1 There are also legal issues as to the GATT compatibility of such schemes. There are not discussed here. See De 
Cendra(2006), Ismer & Neuhoff(2007). 
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2. The Model  
     We use a 4 country general equilibrium model covering the US and the EU as the 
significant potential users of border tax adjustments, China as the major possible target 
country, and a residual rest of the world. There are no explicit dynamics. We use a single 
period model based on 2006 data, which can be interpreted as a steady state. Region utility 
functions directly incorporate temperature change. We capture the incremental impacts of 
BTAs on emissions in 2006, and onto temperature change over 50 years, which in turn enters 
utility. We index the 4 countries in the model by i and we use k  to denote double country 
terms (exports of country i product to country k ).  
     In the model, there are two goods produced in each region, indexed by j  ( 1,2j = ). Good 
1 has high energy (emissions) intensity, and good 2 has low energy (emissions) intensity. 
This restriction on dimensionality is a reflection of data availability. Goods across countries 
are assumed heterogeneous (the Armington assumption). The model specifies one fixed and 
one variable factor in production of each good; E is energy input and is mobile across both 
countries and sectors. We assume ROW is the energy exporter and for simplicity, ROW does 
not produce final goods. China, EU and US thus export final goods to ROW and import 
energy from ROW. 
        In China, the EU and the US production functions are: 
        ( )
k
jk k k
j j jY E
αϕ=  k =country, j=sector    1, 3k = L , 1, 2j =                      (1)                                             
     where kjY  is the output of good j produced in country k , 
k
jE  is the energy input in 
country k ’s production of good j , kjϕ  are units terms (scalar parameters), and 1kjα <   are the 
production exponents.  
   We assume that the energy input receives its value marginal product, which in turn equals 
the  energy price ,ie  
       1( )
k
j
k
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E j j j j jk
j
Y
p P P E
E
αϕ α −∂= =∂      1, 3k = L  ,  1, 2j =                             (2)            
       We assume the Rest of the World is the energy exporting country, but unlike in 
traditional general equilibrium models which use a fixed endowment of energy, here we 
introduce an extraction cost function for the energy exporting country into the model. As a 
result of the extraction cost functions in ROW, energy supply by ROW and with this global 
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emissions are now endogenously determined. To keep the model tractable, we model the US, 
the EU, and China as oil importing with an exogenous endowment of energy iE . 
   The extraction cost function we use implies an increasing marginal cost of extraction and 
is written as 
              321)(
BQBBQFK +==                                                                          (3) 
where K is the extraction cost , and Q  (oil) is energy extracted . 
From the first-order conditions for the extraction cost function, we get  
         3 12 3
( ) B
E
dK dF Qp B B Q
dQ dQ
−= = =                                                          (4) 
and the implied energy supply elasticity is  
       3 1
dK KEQ B
dQ Q
= = −   .                                                                      (5)     
Dividing the extraction cost function by the energy price, we can calculate the resources 
that are used in energy extraction. 
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 On the demand side of the model, we assume a  representative household in each 
country with a utility function defined over both goods and global temperature change (which 
we later relate to emissions). We write this as     
         βσ
σσσσσσσ )(][),( 1
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Δ−+=Δ= −
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         (7)                                   
 where following Cai, Riezman & Whalley (2009), iRX  is a composite  of consumption 
of high and low energy intensive goods in all regions in country i, and TΔ  is global 
temperature change. iH is a composite of high emission goods consumption across country 
sources, and  iL  is a composite of low emission goods consumption across country sources, 
diσ is the substitution elasticity between high and low emission goods in country i , β  is the 
utility weight placed on damage from temperature change.  
In this formulation, we specify expected damage from emissions today as related to 
future induced incremental temperature change from today’s emissions relative to some 
upper bound. C can thus be thought of as the global temperature change at which all 
economic activity ceases (say, 20℃). In this formulation, as TΔ  approaches C, utility goes to 
zero; and as TΔ  goes to zero, there is no welfare impact of temperature change. We interpret 
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TΔ  as the temperature change that will accrue over 50 years out to 2056 as a result of 
incremental emissions (energy use) in 2006. 
In the utility functions, iRX  is, in turn, a two level nested CES function. Each region is 
assumed to maximize utility by first choosing among high and low energy (emission) 
intensity goods, and each region then chooses among domestic  and other country source of 
supply at a second level. iRX  can thus be written as  
        ),,,,,( 32
3
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
1
1 iiiiiii XXXXXXfRX =                             (8) 
where kijX  is  country  i ’s consumption of  good j  produced in country k . 
Each of the four regions maximizes a top level utility function subject to a budget 
constraint. If iI is income in country i , this can be written as 
        i
k j
k
ij
k
ij IXP =∑∑                    1, 4i = L .                                            (9) 
   Income in China, EU and US is revenue from the sale of goods minus import payments 
to ROW for energy. It also includes revenues from the sale of iE  , the energy endowment in 
country i. We include carbon pricing revenue in the budget constraint, in the form of added 
costs from an internal carbon price (reflected in emissions reduction targets)  related to 
emissions from energy use. We discuss this in more detail below. We also incorporate  border 
measures reflecting tariffs on imports and rebates on exports under border tax adjustments .If 
we assume an exogenously given trade imbalance, the income side of the budget constraint 
becomes 
iii
j
i
i
jE
i
j
i
ji TRRRCEEpYPI +++−−= ∑ )(         1, 3i = L .            (10) 
where iRC  is carbon pricing revenue, iR  is import tariff revenue, and  iTR  are exogenous 
transfers between countries (net goods import plus net energy import). These can be zero, but 
incorporating them allows calibration to unbalanced trade data.  
  Income in the ROW includes energy export revenues and adding transfers from or to 
abroad gives 
44 TRKQpI E +−=                                                                        (11) 
In the model we also incorporate a temperature change function specifying how 
temperature change varies with annual emissions levels, assumed to prevail over a number of 
years. For simplicity, we abstract from emissions growth in later years due to GDP growth, 
and any changes in emissions intensity per unit of GDP. This is a strong assumption given 
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both growth and emissions intensities change in China, but is adopted to keep the model 
simple and tractable.  
 Assuming emissions are related directly to the amount of energy consumption allows us to 
write the temperature change function directly as a function of energy consumption, i.e. 
          cEaEgT b
i j
i
j
b
i j
i
j +==Δ ∑∑∑∑ )()(                        (12) 
   In equilibrium, prices for final goods and energy are such that goods and factor markets 
clear. Goods market clearing implies:  
k
j
i
k
ij YX =∑   4,1L=i , j =1,2  , 1, 3k = L                                       (13) 
   Since energy is mobile across countries, in equilibrium global energy consumption must 
equal global energy extraction. The energy clearing condition is thus:   
∑∑∑ −+=
i
i
i j
i
j ERQEE )(                  1, 3i = L                               (14) 
   where ∑∑
i j
i
jE is energy consumption, ∑
i
iE  is the combined energy endowment in 
China, EU and US, and )( ERQ −  are the energy sales by the ROW (energy extraction minus 
resources used in extraction). 
        We complete the model by specifying possible policy interventions linked to country 
carbon pricing and use of border measures. For each good j produced in country k , we define 
the producer’s price (net of carbon pricing and border measures) as kjP . The internal 
consumer prices in country  i  for good j  imported from country k  (gross of carbon pricing 
and border measures) are denoted by ijkP , and are given by 
          cjk
k
jijk pPP λ+=                                                                                  (15) 
    where cp  is the exogenous price of carbon , jkλ  is the emissions intensity of good 
j produced in country k . This treatment involves applying a border adjustment based on the 
carbon priced emissions costs of production in the importing country. This differs from using 
direct carbon content of goods as in Mattoo et al.(2009), which produces sharply higher 
barriers. cjk pλ  is thus the carbon motivated consumer price adjustment  for good j produced 
in country  i  imported by  country k . 
    The adjustments we consider include different forms of  carbon pricing, carbon motivated 
import tariffs and carbon motivated export rebates.  If we consider country k as the country 
potentially adopting both carbon pricing and border adjustments. jkλ is emission intensity of 
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good j produced in country  k . The adjustment at the border for exports by country i to 
country k is  cjk pλ  , and this same adjustment is used for all domestic production if there is 
no export rebate.  
   If export rebates apply exports from country k can be sold abroad at  kjP  rather than ijkP  
and producers domestically can still cover costs. These are no border tax adjustments faced 
by goods enhancing country k if k has no carbon pricing.        
  We finally also consider cases where the importing country k only uses carbon tariffs as 
the border measure when they adopt carbon pricing, and do not use export rebates. 
 10
3. Data and Model Calibration 
 
        To use this model to analyze the impacts of various border tax adjustments, we first 
build a model compatible benchmark general equilibrium data set, which we then use in 
model calibration. Our base case data includes 2006 trade, production, and consumption data 
(as well as data on energy use) for our  good of 2 sector classificatgion (energy /non energy 
intensive), and 1 variable factor (energy) structure for 4 regions (China, US , EU, ROW).       
   
          Table 1 sets out the main features of the data set we have assembled in this form. In 
Table 1-1, GDP data is from the World Bank’s WDI database. The high-emission sector in 
each country is taken to be the manufacturing industry. The low-emission sector in each 
country is taken to be service and agricultural sectors. For Table 1-2, trade data is taken from 
the UNCOMTRADE database, and F.o.b. export values as reported by exporting countries 
are used.  This data as reported aggregates energy and goods trade data in value terms. In 
Table 1-3 , energy data for 2005 is from IEA energy statistics. The unit of account used in the 
IEA statistics data is thousand of tonnes of oil equivalent, which we convert to billion US 
dollars,  (assuming 1 toe = 7.33 barrel of oil equivalent, oil price (2006 average)=$50.64/per 
barrel). The extraction cost data for ROW is calculated using the IEA energy balance table. 
We use all of this data along side 2006 trade production and consumption data.   
       Table 1-4 reports 2006 sector energy intensities calculated using GDP and energy 
consumption data by country. These intensities are 4 times higher in China than in the US 
and 8 times higher in China than in the EU for the energy intensity sector, and even larger for 
the non energy intensive sectors. Table 1-5 presents data on goods consumption by region, 
after adjustments are made to consumption so as to be compatible with GDP minus exports. 
Table 1-6 reports 2006 aggregate energy consumption data from IEA sources. 
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Table 1  Data Used in Model Calibration 
Table 1-1  2006 GDP by Sector by Region (Billion $) 
 China EU-27 US ROW 
 High Low High Low High Low High Low 
GDP by 
sector 1279.23 1378.64 3852.48 10694.22 3006.63 10157.27 5418.78 12839.45 
GDP 2657.87  14546.7  13163.9  18258.23  
             Source: World Bank’s WDI database, OPEC Annual Statistics Bulletin 2007. 
 
Table 1-2  2006 Bilateral Trade Data (Billion $) 
     
 
Export by 
 
Import by 
China EU-27 US ROW 
China  
High 0 159.05 139.22 396.2 
Low 0 85.42 64.58 124.46 
Total 0 244.47 203.8 520.66 
EU-27 
High 64 0 268.93 790.11 
Low 15.29 0 65.82 255.31 
Total 79.29 0 334.75 1045.42 
US 
High 35.33 159.52 0 572.02 
Low 19.89 59.63 0 190.64 
Total 55.22 219.15 0 762.66 
                                            Source: UNCOMTRADE database 
 
 
 
Table 1-3  2005 Adjusted Energy (Oil) Balance Data (Billion $) 
billion $ Energy Endowment 
Net 
Import Consumption 
High 
emission 
sector 
input 
Low 
Emission 
sector 
input 
China 375.79 37.16 412.96 219.00 193.96 
Eu27 120.43 363.26 483.69 254.32 229.37 
US 320.42 272.78 593.20 347.47 245.73 
ROW 673.20 -673.2 0 0 0 
World 1489.84 0 1489.85 820.79 669.06 
 
                      ROW — extraction cost data(Billion $) 
billion $ Extraction Extraction cost Energy Endowment 
ROW 733.16 -59.96 673.20 
                             Source: IEA oil statistics 
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Table 1-4  Emission Intensity Data  
                            
tonne / billion $ High Energy Intensity Sector Low Energy Intensity Sector 
China 0.001127 0.000998 
Eu27 0.000144 0.000130 
US 0.000253 0.000179 
 
Table 1-5  Consumption of Domestic Goods (2006) (Billion $) 
 
Consumption of Domestic Goods 
High oil 
intensity goods 
Low oil 
intensity goods 
China 584.76 1104.18 
Eu27 2729.44 10357.80 
US 2239.76 9887.11 
 
 
Table 1-6  Energy Consumption by Region in 2006 (Billion US $) 
Year China EU-27 US ROW World 
2006 412.96 483.69 593.20 1446.90 2936.75 
Source: International Energy Agency: Key World Energy Statistics, 2008. 
 
 
We calibrate the model to this base case data set in which no border adjustments operate 
using the standard calibration methods set out in Shoven and Whalley (1984). Given the use 
of both CES functions and an energy extraction function in ROW, elasticity parameters play 
an important role in the analysis. 
In the central case model analyses elasticity parameters are set as follows. The 
consumption elasticity that is the top level substitution elasticity between high and low 
emission goods in consumption in all regions is set equal to 0.5. The lower level trade 
elasticity, ie the substitution elasticities between domestic and imported commodities follow 
a “rule of two”, that is the substitution elasticity between domestic and imported goods is set 
equal to 2, as discussed in Hertel al. (2009). This rule was first proposed by Jomini et 
al.(1991) and later tested by Liu, Arndt,and Hertel(2002) in a back-casting exercise with a 
simplified version of the GTAP model. The extraction / energy supply elasticity in ROW is 
0.5. 
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For the temperature change function, we follow Cai, Riezman and Whalley(2009) who 
use projections of temperature change and emissions out to 2056 as Business as Usual 
scenarios (BAU). 
      We use a power function 
                       
0.6137
)(0.001)( ∑∑∑∑ ==Δ
i j
ij
b
i j
ij EEgT                                                  (17) 
      with  g  and b  determined by calibration to emissions levels in the BAU scenario. We 
assume a temperature change TΔ of 5℃ between 2006 and 2056 (consistent with 
Stern(2002)).  
     Table 2 then reports the calibrated preference parameters in equation (7) under alternative 
damage assumptions from incremental temperature change out to 2056. As discussed in Cai 
et al.(2009), the calibrated share parameter β  is a reflection of the assumed severity of 
damage from incremental temperature change. In our central case, we assume a BAU utility 
loss of 3% of GDP in welfare equivalent terms from a 5℃ temperature change out to 2050. 
This implies 1059.0=β . We use the same value of β  for all regions. 
Table 2-1 reports the parameter values in production, preferences and extraction cost 
functions generated by calibration. These are independent of the assumed utility damage due 
to temperature change. 
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Table 2-1   
Model Parameterizations Generated by Calibration to the 2006 Benchmark Data 
 
A． Parameters in C-D production functions 
 China EU-27 US 
    
 
high 
emission 
goods 
low 
emission 
goods 
high 
emission 
goods 
low 
emission 
goods 
high 
emission 
goods 
low 
emission 
goods 
technology 
coefficient 508.478 657.043 2672.699 9517.442 1529.084 8890.901 
shares on 
energy  0.171 0.141 0.066      0.021 0.116      0.024
B.  Parameters in Nested CES Utility functions 
Shares of high and low energy (emission) composite goods 
 China EU-27 US ROW 
 high emission goods 
low 
emission 
goods 
high 
emission 
goods 
low 
emission 
goods 
high 
emission 
goods 
low 
emission 
goods 
high 
emission 
goods 
low 
emission 
goods 
 0.205        0.795      0.054      0.946      0.041 0.959 0.905 0.095 
Shares of consumption of high energy (emission) domestic and import goods
 China EU-27 US ROW 
China-H 0.634        0.163        0.156 0.277        
EU-H 0.210        0.674        0.217 0.391        
US-H 0.156        0.163       0.627 0.333        
Shares of consumption of low energy (emission) domestic and import goods 
China-L 0.799        0.078        0.070 0.272 
EU-L 0.094        0.857        0.070 0.390 
US-L 0.107        0.065        0.860 0.337 
C. Parameters in Extraction functions 
 Constant Parameter Coefficient parameter    
Constant Parameter -428.813 0.025    
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       Table 2-2 shows the size of EU and US border measures associated with carbon pricing 
at different assumed levels. These are the border measures we use in our numerical 
simulation analyses. These follow directly from equations (15), cjk
k
jijk pPP λ+= , and use the 
data in Table 2-2. From these we calculated the price adjustment at the border as ijkcjk Ppλ . 
As can be seen, the barriers are small. Even when carbon pricing is assumed at $200 /ton, 
EU’s import barriers are still less than 3%. The US price adjustment rate is higher than the 
EU, but the level is still small. 
 
 
Table 2-2   
Levels of EU and US Carbon Taxing and Border Measures  
 
  Carbon Pricing Assumed 
 $25 /ton $50 /ton $100 /ton $200 /ton 
EU High emission goods 0.360% 0.720% 1.440% 2.879% 
 Low emission goods 0.325% 0.649% 1.298% 2.597% 
US 
High emission goods 0.634% 1.267% 2.535% 5.070% 
Low emission goods 0.448% 0.896% 1.793% 3.585% 
 
      As we note above, these border measures contrast with significantly higher barriers if the 
carbon content of goods is used, as in Mattoo et al.(2009). These are also sharp differences if 
the emissions implied by production in exporting countries are used since emissions 
intensities in our data are sharply huger in China than in the US and the EU. 
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4. Numerical Analysis of the Effects of Different Carbon Motivated Border 
Measures  
        We have used the resulting calibrated model based on the date in section 3 above to 
simulate the impacts of carbon pricing and border tax adjustments on country welfare and 
global emissions, cross country trade flows and on production by country. The carbon 
motivated policies include domestic carbon pricing at various assumed prices without BTAs, 
similar carbon pricing with BTAs , and carbon pricing with only an import tariff (no export 
rebates). Results from comparing the base case data to model solutions generated for these 
border and domestic measures are presented in Tables 3-1 to 3-6.  
       The impacts generally on all countries from carbon motivated border measures are 
small. These reflect both the calculation of border measures discussed earlier and based on 
the emissions generated by comparable domestic production in the importing country, 
rather than the carbon contained in the imported good, and the role played by the difference 
in emission intensity across sectors rather than levels. We use carbon emissions by domestic 
production in the importing country measure as this correspond to proposed border 
measures in the US case.   
       The result also confirm that BTAs are not neutral in their impacts due to sector 
specificity,  and  hence relative price effects occurs. As for the effects of BTAs on 
emissions, BTAs alleviate leakage effects as expected1, which counteract the emissions 
reduction effects of country carbon pricing. As for trade flows, compared with no BTAs, 
BTAs reduce the imports of countries implementing measures and increase the imports of 
other countries. With carbon pricing and BTAs the value of production in countries with 
carbon taxes increases, and other country production values decrease compared no BTAs.   
In Table 3-1, we report the results of both carbon pricing and border tax adjustments 
(import tariff and export rebate) being used by the EU against the US and China as an 
example of a BTA policy change in the model. We make different assumptions on the levels 
of domestic carbon pricing which vary between $25/ton and $200/ton , and report results in 
each case. We first measure welfare impacts using Hicksian compensating variation 
measures across base case and new equilibria, applied to the country utility functions 
specified in the model description above. In these utility based welfare measures the welfare 
impacts of climate change appears directly, unlike other models. Compared with no carbon 
                                                 
1 Also see the discuss of leakage in Demailly et al(2005), Demaret & Stewardson(1994) ,Fischer & Fox(2009).  
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pricing, all countries welfare increases despite the use of border measures against the US 
and China. This reflects the joint utility gain from reduced emissions due to EU carbon 
pricing. Global emissions fall and as expected EU emissions decrease, and US and China 
increase emissions.  In terms of trade impacts, the EU reduces imports of non energy 
intensive goods while China and the US increase imports of non energy intensive goods. 
The value of domestic production in the EU, the US and China increases as prices rise due to 
carbon pricing and the use of border measures. Results in Table 3-1 show that sector specific 
BTAs are non neutral in impacts if carbon pricing occurs when  energy intensities are  
different between sectors. 
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  Table 3-1   Impacts of Carbon Pricing and Border Tax Adjustments  
by EU against US and China  
  Carbon Pricing Assumed 
 $25 /ton $50 /ton $100 /ton $200 /ton 
1. Welfare Impacts of 
Hicksian EV as % of 
GDP 
EU 0.0072% 0.0142% 0.0280% 0.0541% 
US 0.0017% 0.0033% 0.0066% 0.0132% 
China 0.0018% 0.0036% 0.0073% 0.0145% 
2.Impacts on 
Emissions (% change) 
EU -0.063% -0.125% -0.251% -0.502% 
US 0.027% 0.055% 0.109% 0.219% 
China 0.032% 0.064% 0.127% 0.255% 
Total -0.001% -0.001% -0.003% -0.005% 
3.Impacts on Imports 
of non Energy goods 
by value at seller’s 
prices (% change) 
EU -0.046% -0.093% -0.185% -0.372% 
US 0.043% 0.086% 0.173% 0.345% 
China 0.043% 0.085% 0.168% 0.333% 
4. Impacts on domestic 
production  (% 
change) 
Energy Intensive 
 
EU 
 
0.1945%
 
0.3890%
 
0.7776%
 
1.5537% 
US 0.0022% 0.0044% 0.0085% 0.0163% 
China 0.0033% 0.0066% 0.0132% 0.0267% 
     
Energy Non-Intensive EU 0.3056% 0.6107% 1.2199% 2.4340% 
US 0.0246% 0.0491% 0.0977% 0.1929% 
China 0.0303% 0.0603% 0.1198% 0.2360% 
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In Tables 3-2 to 3-6, we use our central case model specification, to  analyze three 
broad groupings of country carbon pricing arrangements and accompanying BTAs. These 
are only the EU has carbon pricing, only the US has carbon pricing and both the EU and US 
jointly have carbon pricing.  
For the first group for which the EU has carbon pricing, we analyze the impacts of 
three sub forms, the EU has no BTAs, the EU has BTAs against China and US, and the EU 
have import tariffs against China and the US. In the second group, in which the US has 
carbon pricing, we again analyze three sub forms, US has no BTAs, US has BTAs against 
China and the EU, and US have import tariffs against China and the EU. In the third group, 
both the EU and US have carbon pricing and we analyze seven sub forms in this case. These 
are both EU and US have no BTAs, both the EU and the US have BTAs against China, both 
the EU and the US have import tariffs against China (with no export rebates), only EU has 
BTAs against China, only EU has import tariff against China, only US has BTAs against 
China, only US has tariff against China. We again make calculations for different carbon 
pricing assumptions of   $25 /ton, $50/ton, $100 /ton, and $200 /ton.   
We report Hicksian EVs as a percentage of income. Generally in these results carbon 
pricing without BTAs increases domestic welfare and also decreases or increases other 
country’s welfare due to terms of trade effects. This is illustrated in case 2.1. Here, carbon 
pricing in the EU without BTAs increases EU’s welfare, reduces China’s welfare, and 
increases US’s welfare. These results occur because China faces a higher consumer price for 
imported goods from the EU and reduce their consumption of EU goods. With carbon 
pricing assumed at $25 /ton, $50/ton, $100 /ton, $200 /ton, welfare changes are still small;  
for the EU 0.0035%, 0.0070%, 0.0139%  and 0.0274% of income, for the US 0.0003%, 
0.0006%, 0.0013% and 0.0026% of income, and China -0.0001%,-0.0001%,-0.0003% and -
0.0005% of income.   
Import tariffs increase the welfare of the country with carbon taxes, and reduce the 
welfare of other countries. In case 1.3, compared with case 1.1, EU’s import tariffs increase 
EU welfare, but reduce US and China welfare, due to possible terms of trade effects.  This in 
large part also reflects the small size of barriers, which given elasticities in the model are 
below optimal tariffs. BTAs increase the welfare of all countries, since export rebates by the 
carbon pricing country reduce the import prices in other countries, increasing other country 
consumption. In case 1.3, compared with case 1.1, EU’s import tariffs increase the welfare 
of EU, US and China.  Cases 2 and  3 show similar results . 
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Table 3-2   Impacts of Carbon Motivated Border Measures on Welfare 
(Hicksian EV as % of GDP) 
 
 
 Carbon Pricing Assumed 
1. EU Carbon Pricing  $25 /ton $50 /ton $100 
/ton 
$200 /ton 
1.1 No BTA 
EU 0.0035% 0.0070% 0.0139% 0.0274% 
US 0.0003% 0.0006% 0.0013% 0.0026% 
China -0.0001% -0.0001% -0.0003% -0.0005% 
  
1.2 EU BTA against China, 
US 
EU 0.0072% 0.0142% 0.0280% 0.0541% 
US 0.0017% 0.0033% 0.0066% 0.0132% 
China 0.0018% 0.0036% 0.0073% 0.0145% 
  
1.3 EU tariff against China, 
US 
EU 0.0093% 0.0184% 0.0363% 0.0707% 
US 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 
China -0.0014% -0.0028% -0.0057% -0.0112% 
     
2. US Carbon Pricing   
2.1 No BTA 
EU 0.0022% 0.0044% 0.0089% 0.0179% 
US 0.0057% 0.0114% 0.0225% 0.0437% 
China -0.0004% -0.0007% -0.0014% -0.0026% 
  
2.2 US BTA against China, 
EU 
EU 0.0018% 0.0036% 0.0072% 0.0144% 
US 0.0110% 0.0216% 0.0420% 0.0794% 
China 0.0024% 0.0047% 0.0093% 0.0184% 
  
2.3 US tariff against China, 
EU 
EU -0.0009% -0.0018% -0.0035% -0.0066% 
US 0.0142% 0.0282% 0.0549% 0.1047% 
China -0.0013% -0.0025% -0.0051% -0.0101% 
3 . EU and US Carbon 
Pricing  
  
3.1 No BTA 
EU 0.0057% 0.0114% 0.0228% 0.0453% 
US 0.0061% 0.0120% 0.0238% 0.0465% 
China -0.0004% -0.0008% -0.0015% -0.0024% 
3.2 EU and US BTA against 
China 
EU 0.0121% 0.0241% 0.0475% 0.0922% 
US 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 
China 0.0041% 0.0082% 0.0163% 0.0325% 
  
3.3 EU and US tariff against 
China 
EU 0.0121% 0.0240% 0.0473% 0.0919% 
US 0.0102% 0.0201% 0.0394% 0.0754% 
China -0.0031% -0.0062% -0.0123% -0.0243% 
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3.4 Only EU BTA against 
China 
EU 0.0094% 0.0186% 0.0368% 0.0719% 
US 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 
China 0.0016% 0.0032% 0.0066% 0.0135% 
  
3.5 Only EU tariff against 
China 
EU 0.0095% 0.0190% 0.0375% 0.0736% 
US 0.0066% 0.0131% 0.0259% 0.0504% 
China -0.0019% -0.0037% -0.0073% -0.0142% 
  
3.6 Only US BTA against 
China 
EU 0.0085% 0.0169% 0.0335% 0.0657% 
US 0.0090% 0.0178% 0.0348% 0.0666% 
China 0.0021% 0.0041% 0.0084% 0.0171% 
  
3.7 Only US tariff against 
China 
EU 0.0083% 0.0164% 0.0326% 0.0638% 
US 0.0096% 0.0190% 0.0373% 0.0715% 
China -0.0017% -0.0033% -0.0065% -0.0127% 
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Table 3-3 reports impacts on country emissions. Again, these are small, but in total the 
effects reduce global emissions. Carbon pricing without BTAs reduces the emissions of each 
countries using carbon pricing and increases other country’s emissions. They  reduce global 
emissions, but  leakage effects arise.  In case 1.1, EU carbon taxes without BTAs reduce the 
emissions of the EU and increase the emissions of China and the US. With carbon pricing 
assumed at $25 /ton, $50/ton, $100 /ton, or $200 /ton, the changes in  EU  emissions are -
0.209%,-0.417%,-0.836% and -1.676% respectively. The changes in  US  emissions are 
0.094%,0.187%,0.376% and 0.755% respectively, and changes in China’s emissions  are 
0.098%,0.196%,0.394% and 0.791% respectively. Global emissions change by  -0.003%,-
0.006%,-0.013% and -0.024% respectively, with only small effects. In case 2.1, US carbon taxes 
reduce the emissions of the US and increase the emissions of China and EU. In case 3.1, both EU 
and US carbon pricing reduce EU and US emissions and increases China’s emissions.   
Although BTAs alleviate leakage effects as expected, they also counteract the emissions 
reduction effects of carbon pricing. In case 1.2, with carbon pricing assumed at $25 /ton, $50/ton, 
$100 /ton, or $200 /ton, global emissions change by  -0.001%,-0.001%,-0.003%, and -0.005% 
respectively.  Compared with case 1.1, BTAs make the  global emissions reductions smaller. 
This is because China and EU emissions increases are smaller and  the EU emissions increase 
rises due to  border measures in the form of export rebates and import tariffs. Cases 2.2, 3.2,3.4, 
3.6 show similar results. 
        Table 3-3 also reports the emissions effects of carbon pricing with carbon tariffs alone (no 
export rebates). Comparing case 1.3 with 1.2, the effects of carbon tariffs are similar to BTAs. 
They alleviate leakage effects as expected, and also counteract the emissions reduction effects of 
carbon pricing.  The effects of carbon tariff are a little smaller than BTAs. 2.3, 3.3, 3.5, 3.7 show 
similar results to case 1.3 . 
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Table 3-3   Impacts of Carbon Motivated Border Measures on Emissions (Energy Use) 
 (% Change in Emissions) 
 
 Carbon Pricing Assumed 
1. EU Carbon Pricing $25 /ton $50 /ton $100 /ton $200 /ton 
1.1 No BTA 
EU -0.209% -0.417% -0.836% -1.676% 
US 0.094% 0.187% 0.376% 0.755% 
China 0.098% 0.196% 0.394% 0.791% 
Total -0.003% -0.006% -0.013% -0.024% 
1.2 EU BTA against 
China, US 
EU -0.063% -0.125% -0.251% -0.502% 
US 0.027% 0.055% 0.109% 0.219% 
China 0.032% 0.064% 0.127% 0.255% 
Total -0.001% -0.001% -0.003% -0.005% 
1.3 EU tariff against 
China, US 
EU -0.103% -0.207% -0.414% -0.831% 
US 0.055% 0.109% 0.219% 0.440% 
China 0.039% 0.077% 0.155% 0.312% 
Total -0.001% -0.002% -0.004% -0.008% 
2. US Carbon 
Pricing   
2.1 No BTA 
EU 0.196% 0.393% 0.789% 1.590% 
US -0.306% -0.613% -1.229% -2.469% 
China 0.188% 0.377% 0.756% 1.526% 
Total -0.006% -0.012% -0.024% -0.044% 
2.2 US BTA against 
China, EU 
EU 0.053% 0.106% 0.212% 0.424% 
US -0.088% -0.175% -0.351% -0.702% 
China 0.060% 0.119% 0.239% 0.477% 
Total -0.001% -0.002% -0.005% -0.009% 
2.3 US tariff against 
China, EU 
EU 0.088% 0.177% 0.355% 0.714% 
US -0.133% -0.267% -0.536% -1.077% 
China 0.081% 0.162% 0.326% 0.654% 
Total -0.002% -0.004% -0.008% -0.016% 
3 . EU and US 
Carbon Pricing 
  
3.1 No BTA 
EU -0.013% -0.025% -0.048% -0.089% 
US -0.213% -0.213% -0.853% -1.714% 
China 0.286% 0.575% 1.158% 2.348% 
Total -0.009% -0.018% -0.035% -0.061% 
3.2 EU and US BTA 
against China 
EU 0.066% 0.132% 0.263% 0.528% 
US -0.129% -0.259% -0.518% -1.041% 
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China 0.101% 0.202% 0.405% 0.816% 
Total -0.002% -0.004% -0.008% -0.017% 
3.3 EU and US tariff 
against China 
EU 0.058% 0.115% 0.231% 0.464% 
US -0.139% -0.278% -0.557% -1.119% 
China 0.120% 0.241% 0.484% 0.977% 
Total -0.003% -0.006% -0.012% -0.024% 
3.4 Only EU BTA 
against China 
EU 0.054% 0.109% 0.218% 0.442% 
US -0.207% -0.414% -0.830% -1.668% 
China 0.210% 0.422% 0.848% 1.713% 
Total -0.007% -0.013% -0.025% -0.046% 
3.5 Only EU tariff 
against China 
EU 0.046% 0.092% 0.185% 0.376% 
US -0.207% -0.414% -0.830% -1.667% 
China 0.218% 0.437% 0.880% 1.780% 
Total -0.007% -0.014% -0.027% -0.049% 
3.6 Only US BTA 
against China 
EU -0.001% -0.002% -0.005% -0.010% 
US -0.135% -0.270% -0.543% -1.093% 
China 0.177% 0.355% 0.715% 1.448% 
Total -0.005% -0.010% -0.019% -0.037% 
3.7 Only US tariff 
against China 
EU -0.001% -0.002% -0.004% -0.007% 
US -0.145% -0.290% -0.581% -1.172% 
China 0.189% 0.379% 0.763% 1.546% 
Total -0.006% -0.011% -0.021% -0.040% 
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      Tables 3-4 and 3-5 show the impacts of carbon pricing and border measures on trade flows in 
the form of imports and exports. Table 3-4 compares the effects of carbon pricing without BTAs, 
with BTAs, and with only a tariff on imports. Carbon pricing generally increases imports of 
domestic countries and reduces imports of other countries. In case 1.1, the EU’s carbon tax 
increases EU’s import of high and low emission intensive goods, and reduces US and China’s 
imports of high and low emission intensive goods. In case 2.1, US’s carbon tax increases US’s 
imports and reduces China’s imports. In case 3.1 joint  EU and US carbon pricing increases both 
EU and US’s imports and reduces China’s imports. With BTAs carbon pricing reduces country’s 
import due to the import tariff, and other country’s imports increase due to the export rebate of 
the carbon pricing country.   
    For the case of only an import tariff without an export rebate, imports of the country with a 
carbon tax decrease further and other country’s imports increase less compared with full BTAs.  
In case 3.2,  EU and US BTAs against China increase EU  imports compared to the case without 
BTAs. This is because the energy intensity of EU production is lower than the US the EU’s 
carbon motivated  import tariff rate and export rebate rate is lower than that of the US.   
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Table 3-4   Impacts of Carbon Motivated Border Measures on Imports 
 % Change of  Imports of High Emissions Goods  % Change of  Imports of Low Emissions Goods 
 Carbon Pricing Assumed  Carbon Pricing Assumed 
1. EU Carbon Pricing $25 /ton $50 /ton $100 /ton $200 /ton  $25 /ton $50 /ton $100 /ton $200 /ton 
1.1 No BTA 
EU 0.105% 0.211% 0.422% 0.845%  0.163% 0.327% 0.654% 1.308%
US -0.015% -0.030% -0.061% -0.121%  -0.025% -0.050% -0.099% -0.197%
China -0.022% -0.044% -0.088% -0.175%  -0.032% -0.065% -0.130% -0.261%
  
1.2 EU BTA against 
China, US 
EU -0.185% -0.369% -0.733% -1.445%  -0.046% -0.093% -0.185% -0.372%
US 0.076% 0.151% 0.302% 0.604%  0.043% 0.086% 0.173% 0.345%
China 0.077% 0.154% 0.308% 0.617%  0.043% 0.085% 0.168% 0.333%
  
1.3 EU tariff against 
China, US 
EU -0.293% -0.584% -1.160% -2.290%  -0.104% -0.208% -0.415% -0.828%
US -0.047% -0.094% -0.187% -0.372%  -0.085% -0.170% -0.338% -0.667%
China -0.089% -0.177% -0.353% -0.703%  -0.107% -0.215% -0.429% -0.853%
          
2. US Carbon Pricing   
2.1 No BTA 
EU 0.005% 0.011% 0.021% 0.042%  0.017% 0.034% 0.070% 0.144%
US 0.201% 0.403% 0.806% 1.616%  0.277% 0.554% 1.106% 2.207%
China -0.040% -0.079% -0.158% -0.317%  -0.095% -0.190% -0.380% -0.757%
  
2.2 US BTA against 
China, EU 
EU 0.114% 0.228% 0.456% 0.913%  0.035% 0.070% 0.140% 0.280%
US -0.320% -0.636% -1.256% -2.449%  0.084% 0.167% 0.325% 0.617%
China 0.082% 0.164% 0.328% 0.654%  0.043% 0.084% 0.165% 0.321%
  
2.3 US tariff against 
China, EU 
EU -0.094% -0.188% -0.373% -0.736%  -0.111% -0.221% -0.436% -0.850%
US -0.443% -0.881% -1.741% -3.401%  0.015% 0.028% 0.048% 0.069%
China -0.091% -0.181% -0.361% -0.716%  -0.201% -0.402% -0.799% -1.579%
3 . EU and US   
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Carbon Pricing 
3.1 No BTA 
EU 0.111% 0.221% 0.443% 0.889%  0.181% 0.362% 0.725% 1.456%
US 0.186% 0.373% 0.746% 1.495%  0.252% 0.504% 1.007% 2.009%
China -0.061% -0.123% -0.245% -0.490%  -0.127% -0.256% -0.511% -1.015%
  
3.2 EU and US BTA 
against China 
EU 0.143% 0.284% 0.566% 1.124%  0.246% 0.491% 0.980% 1.951%
US 0.150% 0.301% 0.609% 1.241%  0.223% 0.444% 0.883% 1.746%
China 0.148% 0.295% 0.593% 1.194%  0.097% 0.192% 0.382% 0.759%
  
3.3 EU and US tariff 
against China 
EU 0.096% 0.191% 0.379% 0.752%  0.205% 0.410% 0.818% 1.626%
US 0.107% 0.215% 0.437% 0.899%  0.186% 0.372% 0.738% 1.457%
China -0.206% -0.412% -0.820% -1.625%  -0.300% -0.600% -1.194% -2.360%
  
3.4 Only EU BTA 
against China 
EU -0.008% -0.014% -0.026% -0.041%  0.077% 0.155% 0.310% 0.622%
US 0.264% 0.528% 1.056% 2.111%  0.333% 0.666% 1.330% 2.655%
China 0.052% 0.104% 0.211% 0.430%  -0.062% -0.125% -0.250% -0.491%
  
3.5 Only EU tariff 
against China 
EU -0.041% -0.081% -0.159% -0.306%  0.054% 0.108% 0.216% 0.434%
US 0.254% 0.507% 1.014% 2.027%  0.322% 0.644% 1.288% 2.570%
China -0.128% -0.255% -0.509% -1.011%  -0.213% -0.426% -0.849% -1.684%
  
3.6 Only US BTA 
against China 
EU 0.261% 0.521% 1.039% 2.066%  0.349% 0.698% 1.394% 2.784%
US 0.072% 0.147% 0.301% 0.634%  0.142% 0.282% 0.560% 1.102%
China 0.035% 0.071% 0.147% 0.317%  0.032% 0.064% 0.130% 0.270%
  
3.7 Only US tariff 
against China 
EU 0.247% 0.494% 0.984% 1.954%  0.332% 0.664% 1.326% 2.644%
US 0.039% 0.081% 0.169% 0.370%  0.116% 0.231% 0.458% 0.899%
China -0.140% -0.280% -0.556% -1.099%  -0.215% -0.430% -0.856% -1.693%
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      Table 3-5 compares the effects of carbon pricing without BTAs, with BTAs, and with only a 
tariff on exports. Cases 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1 indicate that carbon pricing reduces the exports of the 
country or countries using carbon pricing, and increases the exports of other countries. Countries 
without carbon pricing thus have a competitive advantage. With BTAs, as shown in case 1.2, 2.2 , 
3.2,3.4 and 3.6 ,with EU BTAs against China, US BTAs against China ,and both EU and US 
BTAs against China, China’s exports fall in value terms compared with no BTAs.  When there is 
only a carbon tariff and no export rebates in the carbon pricing country, carbon tariffs reduce all 
counties’ exports compared to BTAs.
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Table 3-5   Impacts of Carbon Motivated Border Measures on Exports (Value Term) 
 % Change of  Exports of High Emissions Goods  % Change of  Exports of Low Emissions Goods 
 Carbon Pricing Assumed  Carbon Pricing Assumed 
1. EU Carbon Pricing $25 /ton $50 /ton $100 /ton $200 /ton  $25 /ton $50 /ton $100 /ton $200 /ton 
1.1 No BTA 
EU -0.046% -0.093% -0.185% -0.371%  -0.062% -0.124% -0.248% -0.495%
US 0.015% 0.031% 0.061% 0.123%  0.045% 0.091% 0.181% 0.361%
China 0.024% 0.047% 0.095% 0.191%  0.064% 0.129% 0.257% 0.514%
  
1.2 EU BTA against 
China, US 
EU -0.062% -0.124% -0.248% -0.492%  -0.094% -0.188% -0.375% -0.746%
US 0.031% 0.063% 0.127% 0.256%  0.090% 0.179% 0.356% 0.704%
China 0.010% 0.020% 0.040% 0.082%  0.054% 0.108% 0.214% 0.423%
  
1.3 EU tariff against 
China, US 
EU -0.105% -0.209% -0.417% -0.829%  -0.150% -0.299% -0.597% -1.184%
US -0.027% -0.054% -0.107% -0.208%  0.058% 0.116% 0.230% 0.453%
China -0.013% -0.026% -0.051% -0.099%  0.042% 0.083% 0.165% 0.325%
          
2. US Carbon Pricing   
2.1 No BTA 
EU 0.025% 0.050% 0.101% 0.204%  0.038% 0.077% 0.152% 0.300%
US -0.099% -0.198% -0.396% -0.791%  -0.113% -0.225% -0.449% -0.891%
China 0.051% 0.103% 0.206% 0.414%  0.104% 0.209% 0.418% 0.834%
  
2.2 US BTA against 
China, EU 
EU 0.006% 0.013% 0.028% 0.065%  0.146% 0.291% 0.574% 1.119%
US -0.165% -0.329% -0.652% -1.285%  -0.197% -0.392% -0.778% -1.533%
China 0.006% 0.012% 0.025% 0.056%  0.106% 0.212% 0.419% 0.819%
  
2.3 US tariff against 
China, EU 
EU -0.054% -0.106% -0.209% -0.405%  0.114% 0.226% 0.445% 0.863%
US -0.250% -0.498% -0.990% -1.959%  -0.297% -0.592% -1.175% -2.317%
China -0.016% -0.031% -0.059% -0.110%  0.096% 0.192% 0.379% 0.740%
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3 . EU and US 
Carbon Pricing 
  
3.1 No BTA 
EU -0.021% -0.042% -0.084% -0.165%  -0.024% -0.048% -0.096% -0.193%
US -0.084% -0.167% -0.334% -0.665%  -0.068% -0.135% -0.268% -0.529%
China 0.075% 0.150% 0.302% 0.609%  0.169% 0.338% 0.677% 1.355%
  
3.2 EU and US BTA 
against China 
EU 0.064% 0.127% 0.254% 0.506%  0.066% 0.131% 0.257% 0.499%
US -0.018% -0.035% -0.070% -0.135%  0.048% 0.095% 0.191% 0.382%
China 0.016% 0.033% 0.068% 0.146%  0.169% 0.338% 0.671% 1.323%
  
3.3 EU and US tariff 
against China 
EU 0.041% 0.082% 0.163% 0.323%  0.040% 0.080% 0.156% 0.297%
US -0.047% -0.094% -0.188% -0.372%  0.002% 0.004% 0.009% 0.020%
China -0.032% -0.062% -0.122% -0.231%  0.137% 0.273% 0.541% 1.065%
  
3.4 Only EU BTA 
against China 
EU -0.014% -0.028% -0.056% -0.109%  -0.028% -0.056% -0.113% -0.229%
US -0.029% -0.058% -0.115% -0.230%  0.020% 0.039% 0.078% 0.154%
China 0.061% 0.122% 0.245% 0.496%  0.151% 0.301% 0.601% 1.199%
  
3.5 Only EU tariff 
against China 
EU -0.029% -0.058% -0.115% -0.227%  -0.046% -0.092% -0.184% -0.370%
US -0.037% -0.073% -0.146% -0.293%  0.009% 0.017% 0.034% 0.068%
China 0.037% 0.074% 0.149% 0.305%  0.137% 0.274% 0.547% 1.090%
  
3.6 Only US BTA 
against China 
EU 0.057% 0.113% 0.225% 0.446%  0.070% 0.139% 0.274% 0.531%
US -0.073% -0.145% -0.289% -0.573%  -0.040% -0.079% -0.157% -0.307%
China 0.031% 0.062% 0.128% 0.271%  0.188% 0.374% 0.745% 1.477%
  
3.7 Only US tariff 
against China 
EU 0.049% 0.097% 0.192% 0.380%  0.062% 0.124% 0.243% 0.469%
US -0.095% -0.189% -0.377% -0.749%  -0.074% -0.149% -0.296% -0.586%
China 0.007% 0.015% 0.033% 0.080%  0.169% 0.337% 0.670% 1.328%
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        In Table 3-6, we analyze the impacts of carbon pricing and BTAs on production. As shown 
in cases 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1, carbon pricing without BTAs increases the value of production of all 
countries as prices rise with the added cost of carbon in the carbon pricing country.  But with 
BTAs, the value of production in the country with carbon pricing increases, and other country’s 
production value decreases compared to the case of no BTAs.  A carbon tariff alone has similar 
effects to those of BTAs, though the effect is relatively smaller. 
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Table 3-6  Impacts of Carbon Motivated Border Measures on Production (Value Terms) 
 % Change of  High Emissions Goods 
Production 
 % Change of  Low Emissions Goods 
Production 
 Carbon Pricing Assumed  Carbon Pricing Assumed 
1. EU Carbon Pricing $25 /ton $50 /ton $100 /ton $200 /ton  $25 /ton $50 /ton $100 /ton $200 /ton 
1.1 No BTA 
EU 0.0294% 0.0588% 0.1176% 0.2349%  0.0804% 0.1607% 0.3211% 0.6413%
US 0.0134% 0.0267% 0.0535% 0.1072%  0.0110% 0.0222% 0.0443% 0.0886%
China 0.0168% 0.0336% 0.0672% 0.1349%  0.0170% 0.0340% 0.0680% 0.1360%
          
1.2 EU BTA against 
China, US 
EU 0.1945% 0.3890% 0.7776% 1.5537%  0.3056% 0.6107% 1.2199% 2.4340%
US 0.0022% 0.0044% 0.0085% 0.0163%  0.0246% 0.0491% 0.0977% 0.1929%
China 0.0033% 0.0066% 0.0132% 0.0267%  0.0303% 0.0603% 0.1198% 0.2360%
          
1.3 EU tariff against 
China, US 
EU 0.1579% 0.3157% 0.6304% 1.2571%  0.2754% 0.5503% 1.0986% 2.1896%
US 0.0263% 0.0525% 0.1047% 0.2085%  0.0312% 0.0622% 0.1237% 0.2443%
China 0.0055% 0.0109% 0.0220% 0.0446%  0.0200% 0.0398% 0.0786% 0.1533%
          
2. US Carbon Pricing           
2.1 No BTA 
EU 0.0335% 0.0671% 0.1344% 0.2699%  0.0399% 0.0799% 0.1595% 0.3187%
US 0.0566% 0.1130% 0.2255% 0.4490%  0.1416% 0.2829% 0.5643% 1.1226%
China 0.0329% 0.0659% 0.1321% 0.2659%  0.0237% 0.0474% 0.0947% 0.1885%
          
2.2 US BTA against 
China, EU 
EU 0.0043% 0.0085% 0.0171% 0.0341%  0.0448% 0.0891% 0.1765% 0.3464%
US 0.3520% 0.7036% 1.4064% 2.8094%  0.5024% 1.0036% 2.0028% 3.9877%
China 0.0061% 0.0122% 0.0245% 0.0499%  0.0581% 0.1154% 0.2278% 0.4440%
          
2.3 US tariff against 
China, EU 
EU 0.0238% 0.0476% 0.0952% 0.1907%  0.0538% 0.1070% 0.2120% 0.4164%
US 0.3056% 0.6107% 1.2194% 2.4311%  0.4686% 0.9361% 1.8667% 3.7124%
China 0.0104% 0.0209% 0.0421% 0.0855%  0.0543% 0.1076% 0.2118% 0.4101%
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3 . EU and US 
Carbon Pricing 
  
3.1 No BTA 
EU 0.0630% 0.1261% 0.2527% 0.5073%  0.1203% 0.2407% 0.4816% 0.9640%
US 0.0700% 0.1399% 0.2797% 0.5589%  0.1527% 0.3053% 0.6095% 1.2147%
China 0.0497% 0.0997% 0.2002% 0.4042%  0.0408% 0.0817% 0.1638% 0.3287%
  
3.2 EU and US BTA 
against China 
EU 0.2889% 0.5773% 1.1531% 2.3003%  0.4228% 0.8449% 1.6873% 3.3644%
US 0.3124% 0.6242% 1.2458% 2.4815%  0.4510% 0.9007% 1.7963% 3.5727%
China 0.0110% 0.0220% 0.0446% 0.0909%  0.0892% 0.1777% 0.3525% 0.6935%
  
3.3 EU and US tariff 
against China 
EU 0.2602% 0.5200% 1.0381% 2.0688%  0.3902% 0.7797% 1.5562% 3.1005%
US 0.2826% 0.5645% 1.1260% 2.2400%  0.4196% 0.8379% 1.6704% 3.3195%
China 0.0163% 0.0328% 0.0661% 0.1345%  0.0698% 0.1387% 0.2739% 0.5343%
  
3.4 Only EU BTA 
against China 
EU 0.1782% 0.3563% 0.7120% 1.4217%  0.2818% 0.5633% 1.1250% 2.2437%
US 0.1444% 0.2886% 0.5761% 1.1478%  0.2390% 0.4775% 0.9527% 1.8964%
China 0.0345% 0.0690% 0.1386% 0.2795%  0.0537% 0.1073% 0.2138% 0.4247%
  
3.5 Only EU tariff 
against China 
EU 0.1615% 0.3229% 0.6450% 1.2872%  0.2639% 0.5272% 1.0527% 2.0989%
US 0.1327% 0.2651% 0.5290% 1.0532%  0.2259% 0.4514% 0.9004% 1.7913%
China 0.0370% 0.0742% 0.1490% 0.3008%  0.0410% 0.0818% 0.1627% 0.3222%
  
3.6 Only US BTA 
against China 
EU 0.1733% 0.3460% 0.6893% 1.3683%  0.2609% 0.5207% 1.0373% 2.0584%
US 0.2377% 0.4744% 0.9449% 1.8749%  0.3644% 0.7270% 1.4472% 2.8680%
China 0.0263% 0.0528% 0.1064% 0.2162%  0.0763% 0.1519% 0.3012% 0.5923%
  
3.7 Only US tariff 
against China 
EU 0.1614% 0.3220% 0.6410% 1.2705%  0.2463% 0.4915% 0.9784% 1.9393%
US 0.2196% 0.4381% 0.8720% 1.7274%  0.3461% 0.6903% 1.3737% 2.7198%
China 0.0291% 0.0583% 0.1176% 0.2393%  0.0696% 0.1383% 0.2736% 0.5355%
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4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we present models from a numerical multi country general equilibrium model 
with endogenous determined energy extraction which we use to analyze the potential impacts of 
carbon motivated border adjustments on welfare, trade, and emissions. We calibrate our model to 
2006 benchmark data, and using the calibrated parameters analyze the impacts of EU and US’s 
carbon motivated BTAs on welfare, emissions, trade flows and productions. We compare cases 
of no carbon pricing, carbon pricing with BTAs, carbon pricing with only a carbon tariff in a 
model with the US, the EU, China and a residual rest of the world.  
The most striking feature of model results is that the impacts, while of the sign predicted, 
are generally very small. This, in turn, reflects the relatively small barriers involved if carbon 
emissions in production in the importing country are used. If BTAs are uniform across industries 
when the carbon content of the goods are same, price level effects result in neutral impact. 
Smallness of result thus also reflects the impact of differences in carbon emissions intensity 
across production rather than the level of emissions intensity.  Carbon motivated BTAs are not 
neutral when border tax adjustments are sector specific and our results show this, but  as we 
emphasize produce small welfare impacts. This is in contrast to larger impacts of measures based 
on carbon content of commodities as discussed in Mattoo et al (2009). 
As for the effects of BTAs on emissions, though BTAs alleviate leakage effects as expected, 
they also counteract the emissions reduction effects of carbon pricing. For trade flows, compared 
with no BTAs, BTAs reduce imports of the domestic country, and increase the imports of other 
countries. EU or US BTAs against China reduce exports in value terms by China. With BTAs, 
the value of production in the implementing country increases with carbon pricing, and the value 
of production in other countries falls compared to the case with no BTAs.   
The negotiation in Copenhagen in December 2009 and to follow is to set a new series of 
arrangements in place on climate change which will come to play after 2012 in Post-Kyoto world. 
Developing countries, such as  China, Brazil, India who  did not participate in the Kyoto 
negotiation face pressures from the developed world to participate in the new round of 
negotiation, and the prospect of border tax adjustments if they do not participate is a major 
consideration for them.  
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Our results suggest that though the sign of the effects might be as predicted, the size of 
effects might quite small. This reflects both small barriers when carbon emissions in importing 
countries are used as the basis of barriers, and also that it is the difference in emissions intensities 
across production sectors that matters rather than the level of emissions.
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